

Indian Philosophy

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Module No. # 09

Lecture No. # 41

The Mimamsa Philosophy

Welcome viewers to this session; in this session we will discuss Satkhyativada. In the last class we had introduced what is Khyativada; what is theory of error while discussing theory of error. We said that a cogniser cognizing an object what it is not is resulted error. An example I will give: if I will cognize shell as a silver or rope as a snake then there error lies. How error lies? Error lies because of may be extraneous conditions, may be because of the memory, because of the memory function. Now, it would be just to recap what we had said what we had discussed in the last class.

In the theory of error we find that we as a cogniser our sense organs contact with the object. So, here it is a perception we perceive that object and there may be many cases, many situations where the cogniser cannot able to perceive the object as it is because there are many external conditions matter. For example, the distance: the object may not be placed in a proper distance; there may not be sufficient lights, so on. There may be many reasons for that; in the same time, the cogniser may recap, may recollect some kind of object of having some of the features which he or she can identify the object which is presented before him or her. If it is so, then his or her memory object imposes on that perceived object. As a result, he claims the object as it appears in his memory not as he perceives the object and in this case error lies because here the cogniser is not able to cognize the object as it is. Rather, he cognizes the object differently what it is not. So, this is theory of error - theory of Khyativada and as you know different schools have their different opinion on the theory of Khyativada or on the theory of error.

Because of different schools have their different understanding on the theory of error, their understanding, their opinion, their statement about the concept error depends on their theory they prescribe; depends on their argument they adhere to in their discussion in relation to this context.

We said that there are 2 types of Khyativada: one is Asatkhyativada and other is Satkhyativada. When we had discussed about Asatkhyativada, we said that Madhyamika school. A school of Buddhism, Madhyamika school proposes Asatkhyativada. According to Madhyamika school, neither mine nor the external world is real because, they believe that nothing is permanent in this world; everything is in movement everything is in a state of constant flux. If nothing is permanent in this world then, how can you claim that the objects that we find in the physical world are real?

On the other hand, the mind which cognizes, which is able to cognize the object is also real. Therefore, according to Madhyamika neither the physical world nor the mind is real because, whenever the cogniser is cognizing the object the objects is changed; the object does not remain as it is. Therefore, whenever a cogniser cognizes the object, the object gets changed. In this context, Madhyamika school said that that we cannot claim something error in that because, whenever you cognize an object, the object gets changed; it is not the same object as it was one moment before.

So, therefore, they said that we must accept the theory of error is known as Asatkhyativada and for them error lies when we cognize the non-existence as an existence when you prescribe something as an existence by cognizing its non-existence on a particular place For example, let us assume I am a cogniser; now, I am cognizing an object let us say, table. Whenever I am cognizing a table, the table does not remain as it was one moment before. Therefore, my cognition of nonexistence of table stands as an existence therefore, according to Madhyamika school cognizing nonexistence as an existence is resulted as error which is known as Asatkhyativada.

Here you found that Madhyamika school always focused on the nonexistence of existence, which the cogniser is cognizing; always focused on the nonexistence which does not take a particular shape. If I say that my pen is not on my table, now I can cognize the nonexistence of pen on my table here? The nonexistence stands become existence and Madhyamika school focuses on this issue. They said that, how come a

cogniser cognize something which does not exist and further claim that non-existence becomes an existence. As a result, the theory lies as Asatkhyativada and for them all errors are subjective. It differs from person to person. We already discussed about that; that how all error is subjective in nature; that how differs from person to person; time to time and place to place. For example, now you cognize a rope as a snake, but after sometime you may not cognize soon and there may be many factors conditions matter to that.


Moving further in today, we will discuss Satkhyativada. Satkhyativada talks about that error; lies in relation to the existence of an object. If you see, if you remember Asatkhyativada here, we find that error lies in the nonexistence of object, but in case of Satkhyativada we will discuss how error lies in relation to the existence of an object and there are many scholars many schools contribute their opinion their argument on Satkhyativada.

As a result, they portray Satkhyativada in different forms. Somebody say Akhyativada, somebody say Atmakhyativada, somebody say Anirvacaniya Khyativada, so and so forth. Now, we will see how people present their views on Satkhyativada and after presentation of their view they claim that their Khyativada is a different from the other theory because their theory is unique; although they believe that and they admit that their Khyativada comes under the Satkhyativada.

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Satkhyātivāda

- ❖ Satkhyātivāda states that error lies in the cognition of real objects, which means it is found in the cognition of the existence.
- ❖ Satkhyātivāda is of three sorts.
 - i) Ātmakhyāti (Vijnānavādins)
 - ii) Akhyāti (Prabhakara Misra)
 - iii) Anyathākhyāti (Kumarila Bhatt)
- ❖ **Atma khyāti** is prescribed by Vijnāna vādins (Yogāchāra school)- a school of Buddhism.
- ❖ They viewed that mind is the only reality (subjective idealist).

 And, the reality consists in a series of momentary cognitions.

Now, let us see Satkhyativada. As I said, it states that error lies in the cognition of real objects which means it is found in the cognition of the existence something is existed before the cogniser and the cogniser fails to cognize the object as it is. In other words, something is presented before the cogniser, the cogniser is not able to cognize the object, what it is or cognize the object differently then, what it is as a result we find that there is an error in the cognition and this error is known as Satkhyativada.

Further, as I said Satkhyativada is of 3 sorts: one is Atmakhyativada, Akhyativada Anyathakhyativada. Atmakhyativada is stated by or proposed by Vijnanavadins - a school of Buddhism. Akhyativada is proposed by Prabhakara Misra. Prabhakara Misra belongs to the school of Mimamsa and the third one Anyathakhyativada - its stated by Kumarila Bhatt; Kumarila Bhatt belongs to school of Mimamsa.

You might know the fact that Kumarila Bhatt and Prabhakara Misra although they belong to a particular school, Mimamsa school known as Mimamsa school, yet they have different opinion on many of the issues that we find in the Mimamsa school. Now, here also both of them accepted that there is a theory of error and they have given a different name because their view on the theory of error is different from each other.

Now, let us discuss one after another that is, what is the opinion of Vijnanavadins the school of Buddhism? Why they treated theory of error differently because we had already discussed that Madhyamika school which is known as [1]. They treated Khyativada is known as Asatkhyativada and for them, neither mind nor the phenomenal world is real. And, we find that another school known as Vijnana vadins who belong to Buddhism - their view certainly different from Madhyamika in a relation to the theory of error.

Now, it becomes interesting that why it is and on which ground they differ from each other. Certainly, that whenever Madhyamika talks about theory of error they diagnose the nonexistence part. On the other hand, if we will know about the Vijnanavadins theory of error, you find that they always emphasis the fact that the error lies on the existence of an object.

Here they do not discuss about the nonexistence object; they said that even in case of the existence of an object we could not be able to recognize that object as it is. Now, if you

see the situation the standpoint of Vijnanavadins, according to them, mind is real; except mind nothing is real. How they claim mind is real? Because, they are the subjective idealism; they say that whenever we cognize an object we cannot cognize an object in its full form. we have to cognize the object partly then we have to add partly. For example, if I will permit to cognize, if I am allowed to cognize a table then my sense organs will contact to that object and here my sense organs cannot perceive that object completely. My sense organs can see that object from a different angle; say, first my perception lies on the one side of the table - leg of a table then, surface of a table then, side of a table then, if I will go other side I will find the another two legs of a table. So, therefore, in conglomeration of all these components, I can able to claim that I perceive that table which consists of all these components anything that you perceive you cannot perceive the object as a whole. You have to perceive the object as a part; again you add the parts part 1, part 2, part 3, so and so forth.


If you put all these parts together you can able to claim that yes, now it is the time, I can bale to claim that I perceive the object table if it is. So, Vijnanavadins saying that everything is changing because they belong to Buddhism and according to Buddhism nothing is permanent in this world; Vijnanavadins said that if everything is changing then, how it is possible for a cogniser to cognize an object? And, it is true that a cogniser cannot perceive an object in the full form if it is.

So, then here they said it is the mind which captures the part of an object in the form of impression and put together all the impression and resulted an image of an object which we call a full form of that object. Therefore, it is the mind which is real not the object. Because, in the first whenever the cogniser's sense organs contact the part of an object it is captured in the form of image. It is stored in the form of impression in the mind; in the next moment whenever the cogniser cognize another part of that object, the pervious part certainly changes because nothing is permanent in this world.

If it is so, then the table not the same table as he or she had seen it before or the part that he is seeing now in the second time it is not. So, even one moment before, therefore, Vijnanavadins claim that it is the mind which collects all the impressions of different parts of an object and puts together in a whole and able to cognize the object as it is.


As a result, we cognize the object with a particular name; let us say table. Thus, they say that the mind is only real and apart from mind nothing is real in this world and now we will see how they claim that analysis while cognizing in the object where the error lies according to Vijñānavādins. They viewed that mind is the only reality as I said the reality consist in a series of momentary cognition error lies when we consider what is mental as material.

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- ❖ Error lies when we consider what is mental as material.
- ❖ Example; the silver which appears in delusion as real.
- ❖ It is real, not as existing outside in space but as a mode of mind.
- ❖ **Criticism:** Since everything is an idea only, it does not explicate any difference among knower, knowledge, and known.
- ❖ **Akhyāti**
- ❖ This theory of error is advocated by Prabhakara school of Mimāṃsā.
- ❖ It is familiarized as "Viveka khyāti".
- ❖ According to them, there is no invalid cognition.

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Now, if you see their situation, they said that we find that there is some kind of external condition matter. Whenever you cognize an object which is not true for that because whenever you cognize a part of an object that is, get changing for the next time. Thus, they said that error lies because we cognize that something exists permanently and we could able to perceive it in the first time in its full form which is the error for them. Because, to cognize an object in its full form we need the help of mind; because, it is mind which assists to put together all the impression of the parts of the object.

As a result, we claim about that object here. We are not really knowing that mind matters here. To cognize the object what we are perceiving here is that, that it is the object which existed before us. The object needs some kind of external conditions; those may help the cogniser to cognize the object as it is.

Thus, they said that error lies when we consider what is mental as material. We must admit that we cognize the object because of our mind not because it is presented before us; not because we perceive what it is and if you fail to discriminate what is mental one and what is material then, the error lies. If we are not able to accept that it is the mind which claims about that object, then the error lies and if we endorse the fact that the object needs certain external conditions for the cogniser to cognize that object, then the error lies.

Thus, they clearly stated that when we consider what is mental as material error lies; example, the silver which appears in delusion as real; that means, that a cogniser cognizes a shell as a silver. In this situation, Vijñanavadins said that the silver which appears in delusion as also real, it is real not as existent outside in space, but as a mode of mind. We had seen delusion: a cogniser cognizes a shell as silver. Here, Vijñanavadins claim that silver is also real because, it is the mind which really claims about that object and after some time when the silver is sublimed by shell it does not mean that silver does not exist.


Silver exist in the mind of a cognizer and because of that he or she is able to cognize the shell as silver. Here, please note that the shell and silver there are two objects; however, they have some common element and because of that the mind claims about that object is a silver not as a shell and thus, they said that although our claim shell as ,silver although our cognition shell as a silver will be sublimed later; that means, we will rectify later claiming that whatever we had cognized earlier that was wrong. But, yet we should not forgot that the concept silver - the object silver exists in the mind of a cogniser. As a result, the cogniser is able to cognize the object silver, but not a shell. Thus, they said that whenever we cognize an object we should not ignore the function of mind. We should not ignore the concept that mind is the only real and apart from mind nothing is real.

Thus, they claim that it is real; the silver is real although, it is in a delusion form still it is real. Not as existing outside in space, but as a mode of mind. So, this is the standpoint of Vijñanavadins; they always focused about the existence of mind about the object which is stored in the impression, which is stored in the form of image in the mind and because of that, the cogniser cognizes the object differently; what it is not and therefore, we find the error known as Atmakhyativada.

Now, criticism after the standpoint we find criticism. There are many other schools criticize this view - views of Vijñānavādins. They said that since everything is an idea only it does not explicate any difference among knower, knowledge and known. Three components why Vijñānavādins view is criticized; one among the other reasons people said that, if everything depends on our mind if everything rests on our mind and everything we claim because of our mind then, we cannot make a difference among three components: one is known knower and knowledge.


A knower means a cogniser who cognizes the object; known means the object which is to be cognized and the knowledge after cognition - the knower acquires some knowledge acquires some understanding about that object. If you claim, if you the Vijñānavādins claim that everything depends on mind and it is the mind which is only real and nothing is real apart from mind then, how can you differentiate between knower, known and knowledge? Because, if you see mind matters in your all the cases and therefore, we cannot make the distinction among them. If you say knowledge then, here it is the mind which acquires the knowledge, stores in the mind. Then, if you say known according to Vijñānavādins, known is a fact or an object cannot be real because, apart from mind nothing is real. Then, further knower a knower is nothing, but the function of mind in case of cognizing an object if it is. So, then can we claim that Vijñānavādins view is a true fact? Their prescription of the theory of error is a correct one. We cannot claim this is the criticism people raised against Vijñānavādins; view of theory of error which is known as *Atmakhyativada*.

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- ❖ For them, a cognition may be less than true, but it can never be untrue.
- ❖ They convey two fold classification of cognition.
 - i) Valid cognition
 - ii) Memory
- ❖ They do not acknowledge delusive cognition as a third class, because it generates out of these two cognitions.
- ❖ Example; This is silver.
 - This - perceptual
 - Silver - remembered

 In this theory of error, the cogniser fails to discriminate 'percept' from 'smruti'.

Now, moving further to Akhyativada, Akhaytivada stated by Prabhakara school of Mimamsa, it is familiarized as Vivekakhyati. It is another name of Akhyativada; according to them there is no invalid cognition. Now, it is very interesting of Prabhakara school of Mimamsa. You already know what is Prabhakara standpoint, and how Prabhakara differs from Kumarila Bhatt's view on many of the issues. Now, we will see what is Prabhakara school of Mimamsa standpoint in a relation to the theory of error for them that, we cannot say that a cognition is completely unreal.

Now, it may be interesting for you to know why it is. So, and on which ground Prabhakara stated that for them means those who belong to the Prabhakara school of Mimamsa, those thinkers said that a cognition may be less than true, but it can never be untrue.

A cognition, any kind of cognition may be less than true, but cannot be untrue completely. Related to simplify what they mean, they said that whenever we cognize the object, may be we cannot able to cognize the object completely; we cannot claim about that object completely. But we can rule out the fact that our claim about that object is completely false. We cannot rule out the possibility saying that whatever we claim is completely false. What does it mean really? It means that whenever you cognize a object, our cognition may be partially true. If it is not fully true, but we cannot claim at any moment it is untrue or it is false totally.

Thus, they said that we accept two fold classification of cognition. One is valid cognition another is memory and the third that is the delusive cognition. They did not add to their list because, they believe that delusive cognition is resulted by the mixture of two cognitions. What is valid cognition and memory? If at all we find the theory of error it is because the mixture of valid cognition and memory.

So, therefore, the delusive cognition they did not add in the list of their classification of cognition, but they emphasized on true concept. One is valid cognition another is memory. How they said that error lies? Now, we will discuss take, the same example. A cogniser cognizes a shell as silver therefore, he claims that this is a silver within quote and unquote; this is a silver whenever he talks about this.

It implies that the cogniser sense organs contact with that object. So, here there is a perception; there is a perceptual cognition and this is a silver when he talks about the identification of that object is a silver. What happens here is that something which he finds in his mind and claim about that object because of the impression that he has in mind about that object because whenever you perceive that object shell it may be shining it may have some other features and he **he** may have similar kind of impression in his past whenever he had cognized the object silver and therefore, whenever he sees that some objects as shining immediately some impression gathers in his mind and that object the impression is nothing, but a silver. Therefore, he cannot able to discriminate between mind or the memory knowledge from the perceptual knowledge and as a result error lies the same thing I said that this is the silver after the cognition a cogniser claims that this is the silver and this stands for as a perceptual why because here the cogniser perceives that object through his or her sense organ.


Now, silver is remembered because silver is not presented before here. Since, he finds some kind of features in the presented object, something immediately appears in his mind that is silver and in this theory of error, the cogniser fails to discriminate **percept** from Smruti. Since something comes or appears in his mind, the mind becomes more stronger. As a result, mind claims that identify that object or cognize that object as a silver, but not something different from silver.

So, here the error lies when the cogniser cannot **able to** cognize the object properly because, we find there is a clash. There is a conflict between two cognition; one is

perceptual cognition; another is memory cognition and here, the cogniser is in a dilemma to resolve that issue and as a result, it is the mind which compels the cogniser to cognize the object what it is not. That is what I had stated over here; if you can see my slide I said that according to Prabhakara Misra, there are two fold of classification of cognition: one is valid cognition another is memory.


They do not acknowledge delusive cognition as a third class because, it generates out of these two cognitions. Example, this is silver it is claimed by the cogniser. After cognizing an object what it is not, when the cogniser cognizes the object and claiming that this is a silver. Here, this is resulted because of the perceptual cognition and silver is claimed because of the remembered fact and in this theory of error, the cogniser fails to discriminate percept from Smuriti.

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- ❖ As a result, the cogniser cognises smuriti, and smuriti determines the object.
- ❖ Error lies when the remembered silver is claiming as the percept silver.
- ❖ In this situation, the cogniser is in a confused state because of the absence of representational character in the perceived object.
- ❖ **Criticism**
- ❖ There can be no activity unless there is a positive determinate cognition on it.
- ❖ It fails to account presentative character of illusion.

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As a result, cogniser cognizes Smuriti and Smuriti determines the object. Now, it is very clear standpoint of Prabhakara Misra. Further they said, error lies when the remembered silver is claiming as the percept silver. In this situation, the cogniser is in a confused state because of the absence of representational character in the perceived object; it needs further analysis. What is presentational character? If you see, when we can claim about an object? We can claim about an object when we know about its quality and we are sure about its quality - we can validates its quality.

If it so, then in this case, in this case means in case of Akhyativada, the cogniser although finds some kind of features in that object, but not all features here the cogniser finds some of the common features which shared by shell as well as silver and this is resulted to cognize the object as a silver, but not as the shell. But, if the shell is able to project it, all its feature to the cogniser then, the cogniser may not be able to claim that object differently from what it is. Thus, they said that it is also one of the requirement necessary requirement rather that an object must explicate all its essential features. The presentational character of an object should be able to reflect, to recognize, then only the cogniser is able to claim that objects as it is.

Since, the cogniser does not find all the representational character which supposed to have in case of a shell, this error appears. Now, you can see their standpoint; they said that there are 2 types of cognition happens. In this case, one is perceptual cognition where the qualities of an object or the characteristics of object are not presentational in nature. The cogniser not able to find all the features of that object in one hand; on the other hand, since he does not find all features of that object, **he** immediately some kind of a impression stored in his mind because, whatever he sees about that object, some kind of quality, he can see in that. In the same quality he finds in another object and because of that quality he could able to remember some of the objects and that object which finds in his mind, it stands as a cognition.

As a result, mind compares the cogniser to cognize that object with that name and here 3 things matter. One is, there the object does not have a representation of character in it therefore, the cogniser fails to cognize the object in a perceptual basis. The third thing is that the cogniser immediately gathers or immediately finds some kind of object which has the same feature as he sees to that object as seen in that object; because of these 3 components error lies; because, the mind compares the cogniser to cognize the object. Here, he is in a dilemma to distinguish what is perceptual knowledge and what is memory knowledge.

Thus, they said the cogniser cognizes Smruti. Smruti stands for memory and Smruti determines the object. Here, I must bring to your notice that, whenever we talk about Smruti it stands for memory;, but, if I will talk about Sruti – Sruti, stands for something we hear. Smruti stands for something that we find in our mind and Sruti stands when we hear something. Therefore, you should not be in a confused state saying that Smruti may

be Sruti and Sruti may be Smruti. No, these two concepts, these two words have different meaning the two words have different meaning. Sruti means something we hear; Smruti means something we remember. Now, we will see the criticism. Another school; how they made criticism to the Prabhakara school of Mimamsa. They said there can be no activity unless there is a positive determinant cognition on it.


Further, it fails to account the preventative character of illusion. The first, we will discuss that whenever we cognize an object which is not a determinant cognition, we cannot talk about that object. We cannot claim about that object in any form. If you see the Prabhakara school of Mimamsa they said that the object does not have a presentation of character in it. Therefore, the cogniser cannot perceive the object completely; they cannot perceive the object with all its features. In other words, the cogniser cannot able to identify all the features of that object which we find in that object in a later period. Thus, the comments people made that, without cognizing any object how can you claim about that object? Here, I must I must now recap what we had said in the Nyayakas philosophy. We said that there are two types of perception: one is Savikalpaka perception another is Nirvikalpaka perception.

Savikalpaka perception is known as determinate perception and Nirvikalpaka perception is known as indeterminate perception. Indeterminate perception are those perception where the cogniser is not able to cognize; not able to even identify that object what it is. But, in case of Savikalpaka perception, the cogniser cognizes the object as it is or what it is.

In this context, there are many scholars from different schools. They claim that Prabhakara school of Mimamsa view on theory of error cannot be accepted because, they claim that the cogniser is not able to cognize the object. Because the object which is presented before the cogniser does not present, does not reflect all its presentational character and yet the cogniser is able to cognize the object and how it is so? If you do not have a data-made cognition on a particular object, we cannot able to cognize that object. We cannot even talk about that object and how Prabhakara Mimamsa claims that something which cannot cognized by the cogniser completely and the other hand he can able to claim about that object?


The second argument which defeats the whole purposes which cross the route that Akhyativada cannot come under Satkhyativada because, Satkhyativada states that that error lies in relation to the object which is presented before us. That means, error lies on the existence of an object. But, here if you see the Akhyativada on the analysis of Prabhakara Mimamsa, it does not account for the existence of an object; neither indirectly it implies the nonexistence of an object. Because, here they say that it is the memory which compares the cogniser to cognize the object. Thus, it talks about something nonexistent. It does not talk about something which exists over there. Since it does not account for the presentational character, it does not refer to the existence of an object. This theory cannot be accepted or this theory does not stand in a valid form; those are the criticisms.

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Anyathā khyāti

- ❖ This theory of error is advocated by Bhatt School of Mimāṃsā.
- ❖ They found the difference between **recollection** and **perception**.
- ❖ They expressed that when the cogniser is perceiving a snake instead of rope, the idea of snake exists in his mind.
- ❖ It is not due to the recollection.
- ❖ Further, when the snake is sublated by rope, it doesn't mean that the notion of snake is vanished & it has no existence, or it exists in some other place.
- ❖ In toto, both rope and snake exist in that particular moment and in that particular space.

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We will see the code word Anyatha khyati. What is Anyatha khyati? This theory of error is advocated by Bhatt school of Mimamsa. Another school, another thinkers or scholars who come under Mimamsa school - Bhatt school of Mimamsa. According to Bhatt school of Mimamsa, we find 6 pramanas and because of that 6 pramanas, we can have a pramana; we can have valid cognition; we can have a knowledge about object. But, however, in case of Prabhakara Misra, we find only 5 pramanas, not 6 pramanas because Prabhakara Mimamsa did not accept Anu pallavi as an independent pramana.

Now, also in case of theory of error, their view is also different from each other. We have already discussed how Prabhakara Misra, all the thinkers belonging to the Prabhakara Misra school analyze the concept theory of error. Now, we will focus on the Bhatt school of Mimamsa that, how thinkers those belonging to the Bhatt school of Mimamsa, how they treat theory of error differently from Prabhakara Misra and from others.

Now, they found the difference between recollection and perception, whatever we said. So, far we find there is a relation between perception and recollection. The cogniser not able to perceive the object which is presented before him or her and further, it is the mind which recollects some of the objects and that object imposed on the perceived object as a result error lies. This concept broadly we had discussed. So far, now here if you see the Anyatha Khyativada Bhatt school of Mimamsa, they said that there are differences between recollection and perception and further, they said that when the cogniser is perceiving a snake instead of rope, the idea of snake exists in his mind; it is not due to the recollection. When the snake is sublimed by rope, it does not mean that the notion of snake is vanished. It has no existence or it exists in some other place. Both rope and snake exist in that particular moment and in that particular place.


Very interestingly they said Bhatt school of Mimamsa that whenever a cogniser is cognizing an object and cognizing the object what it is not here, the error lies according to them, if a cogniser cognizes a rope as a snake and in a later period the concept snake is rectified that it is not a snake it is a rope then, it does not mean or then it does not imply that the concept of snake or the snake as such does not exist in this earth. It exists in the mind of a cogniser and in the same time the concept rope or the object rope exists in the mind of a cogniser.

The error lies when two objects exist in the mind of a cogniser and because of that the cogniser fails to cognize that object what it is. So, very logical difference if you see they said that whenever a cogniser fails to cognize an object what it is and claims that object is different from what it is. That means, there are two objects: the object he claims and the object which is sublimed by others. These two objects present in his mind and also present in that object in the same time and in the same place. And, the confusion arises because these two objects share some of the common features, some of the essential features and because of that the error lies.

So, it is not like that you perceived something and you recollect some of the information about that. Here, they said the two objects exist in the mind of a cogniser. In one hand and also it exists on a particular place in the same time on the other hand and because of some of the common features between the two objects the error lies. The cogniser not able to claim about that object what it is.


Let us consider an example. A cogniser cognizes rope as a snake; in a later period, the concept snake is sublimed by rope. Here, the Bhatt school of Mimamsa admits that the object snake in rope finds in that place and in that moment when the cogniser cognizing the object it is. So, because these two objects share some of the common features and as a result it happens. Thus, they said even though both rope and snake exists in that particular moment and in that particular space, if you see the prior statement to that then, I had said that when the snake is sublimed by rope it does not mean that the notion of snake is vanished, it has no existence or it exists in some other place. Thus, they said that it is not because of the recollection mind compels us to cognize the object what it is not; rather because of the two objects exist in a particular place in a particular moment we cognize the object differently what it is not.

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- ❖ In this khāyativāda, the object is a misplaced fact.
- ❖ **Criticism**
- ❖ Advaita Vedānta questioned that after sublation of one cognition by another cognition, if both are present in that particular moment and in that space, then what is the difference between a pot and a broken pot.
- ❖ **Anirvācaniḃa khyāti**
- ❖ This theory of error is proposed by Advaita Vedāntins.
- ❖ It states that something is presented to our senses and because of **avidyā** the cogniser cognises the object something different from what it is.

 While cognising the shell as silver, the cogniser's knowledge on silver is imposed on the shell.

Thus, they said as a result we commit the perceptual error Khyativada. Take a common stand point whenever we cognize an object; we cognize the object differently because we find that the similar kind of object also have the same features they share; they bring the

difference between perceptual cognition and recollection which is possible by the help of mind. Thus, in this Khyativada the object is a misplaced fact; that means, the object does not represent its character completely. The object although poses its features, but it does not reflect it. Therefore it is the cogniser who cognizes the object differently than it is not.

Now, few criticisms of Advaita Vedanta; criticize that after sublimation of one cognition by another cognition if both are present in that particular moment and in that space then, what is the difference between a pot and its broken pot?

Now, Advaita vedanta is logically questioned by Kumarila Bhatt. They said that you are accepting that both snake and rope exist in that place even after sublimation. If it is so, then how can you differentiate between a pot and its broken parts? Can you claim that a pot and its broken parts are the same? If it is not so, then how can you claim that our cognition that a snake is sublimated is a rope and even after that, we claim that snake and rope exist in a particular moment and in that same space?

Therefore, your argument on the theory of error does not stand on a valid ground. Hence, it cannot be accepted according to Advaita Vedanta. Now, Advaita vedanta is being questioned by the Bhatt school. They said that that now we are proposing a theory of error known as Anirvacaniya khyati which cannot be explained.

Now, what is Anirvacaniya khyati? That we will discuss in the next class, but for a brief we said that according to Advaita vedanta Brahman is the only real and nothing is real and we cannot explain the Brahman because Brahman is eternal, perceptual and absolute. Therefore, any knowledge that we find is Brahman knowledge. Hence, any error that we commit or that we find in this earth is all Anirvacaniya because, all are the creation of Brahman. All the details that we will discuss in the next class; thank you.